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Abstract 
The implementation of austerity measures presents a dilemma for governments. 
While austerity measures such as cutbacks aim to reduce costs and enhance 
public sector efficiency, the same measures might undermine the motivation of 
employees and, consequently, the prospects of effectively implementing austerity 
programmes. Based on a survey of ministerial officials in Poland and Latvia, this 
article finds that the scale of cutbacks explains a larger decline of staff motivation 
in Latvia than in Poland. The article further shows that motivation was more likely 
to decrease after the crisis if austerity measures involved cutbacks such as staff 
reductions, recruitment freezes, and a reduction of training opportunities. 
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Introduction  
The global financial crisis has provoked a new debate over the status and 
contribution of public administration research in the age of austerity (Kelly and 
Dodds 2012; Lodge and Wegrich 2012; Potter 2012). At the macro-level, research 
has concentrated on the vulnerability of the state in member states of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Lodge and 
Hood 2012), the type of responses that governments have selected to tackle the 
crisis (Armingeon 2012), and the political and economic determinants of fiscal 
consolidation (Lodge and Rodríguez-Vives 2013; Kickert et al 2015). With regard to 
the organisation of public administration, research has explored the impact of the 
crisis on administrative reform (Randma-Liiv and Kickert 2016), decision-making 
and coordination in public administration (Peters et al 2011; Savi/Randma-Liiv 
2015), human resources management practices (Parrado 2010; Demmke 2016), 
compensation packages (OECD 2012) and leadership competencies (Leslie and 
Canwell 2010; Lodge and Hood 2012).  
Much less is still known about the position of public officials vis-à-vis the economic 
crisis and the austerity measures that have since been passed to varying extent in 
European democracies.  This is especially true for the motivation of public officials 
after the crisis. The motivation of employees is widely recognised as a key 
determinant of organisational performance in the public and private sector (Huselid 
1995; Hondeghem and Perry 2009; Brewer and Brewer 2011).  The motivation of 
officials and hence their willingness to exert effort is therefore an important 
condition for the successful implementation of austerity programmes.  
However, governments that seek to implement austerity programmes face a 
dilemma, in that public officials are simultaneously agents and objects of reform. 
On the one hand, austerity measures such as cutbacks, which are the focus of this 
article, tend to be associated with staff reductions, wage and pension cuts, hiring 
and promotion freezes, and fewer resources for training and development (see, for 
instance, Parrado 2010; UNDP 2010; OECD 2012; Raudla et al 2015; Demmke 
2016). Austerity measures might therefore involve hidden costs, in that they have 
an inherently de-motivating effect on public officials. At the same time, 
governments have to rely on public officials to implement austerity measures that 
target public administration and public policy programmes. In the worst case, the 
efficiency gains from austerity measures are offset by motivational losses trapping 
government in a vicious circle cutting costs and motivation at the same time.  
This article addresses this dilemma. It builds on the literature on human resource 
management, motivation and performance in the public and private sector to 
examine the impact of post-crisis cutbacks in the area of civil service management 
on the motivation of public officials. The article focuses on the impact of human 
resource management practices that follow the enactment of cutback measures. It 
examines five areas of civil service management including post-crisis changes in 
recruitment, promotion, dismissal, salary management and training policy in order 
to identify which of these areas have had an effect on the motivation of officials. In 
addition, the article assesses the extent to which the wider context such as the 
scale of a country’s austerity programme and the type of ministry as the immediate 
work context affect the motivation of officials.  
Empirically, the article is based on a survey of ministerial officials in two countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe: Latvia and Poland. Latvia belongs the group of 
European countries that was hardest hit by the global financial crisis. Latvia had to 
apply for support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European 
Commission in order to avoid default. The international loans were followed by a 
large-scale restructuring of the public sector including major cutbacks in the civil 
service. Poland, by contrast, is among the European Union (EU) member states 
that was least affected by the crisis insofar as growth of gross domestic product 
(GDP) remained positive during the post-crisis period. Consequently, public sector 
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restructuring efforts have been far more moderate. The comparison of Poland and 
Latvia therefore provides an opportunity to disentangle the impact of country-level 
austerity measures and individual-level experience of changing management 
practices on the motivation of public officials after the global financial crisis hit 
these two countries.  
The analysis shows that Latvian officials perceive a much larger decline of 
motivation than Polish officials. This difference is likely to reflect the scale of 
cutback measures in Latvia. At the same time, no effect is found within countries 
for officials who work in finance and economics ministries. With regard to 
differences between areas of civil service management, the analysis reveals that 
motivation among ministerial officials was likely to decrease if they experienced 
hiring freezes, staff cuts and a reduction of training opportunities. By contrast, 
promotion freezes and salary cuts are not found to have a consistent effect on the 
motivation of officials.  
Austerity and motivation: What to expect for public 
officials after the crisis  
The motivation of employees is an important determinant of organisational 
performance in the public and private sector (Huselid 1995; Guest 1997; 
Hondeghem and Perry 2009; Brewer and Brewer 2011). Most generally, motivation 
refers to a personal disposition, a psychological trait to act towards a desired goal. 
It is typically associated with the willingness to exert effort. In human resource 
management, motivation is widely regarded as a critical outcome of human 
resource management practices and one of the key mechanisms to generate firm 
performance (Rainey 2001). More specifically, it ‘consists of an individual’s 
direction, intensity, and duration of effort. Motivation manifests itself in the 
individual’s choices to exert effort, choices of how much effort to exert, and choices 
of how long to exert the effort’ (Lepak et al 2006: 232).16  
Research on human resource management has paid particular attention to the 
impact of human resource management strategies and practices on organizational 
performance. Approaches differ with regard to the scope of management practices 
that they examine and the type of performance outcome they seek to observe 
(Wright and Boswell 2002). Broad, inclusive perspectives assess the impact of 
human resource management systems, that is, a combination of human resource 
management functions and their relation to performance (Huselid 1995). By 
contrast, narrow approaches focus on individual management practices, for 
instance, the impact of incentive pay schemes on performance in public and 
private sector organisations (Marsden 2010; Dahlstroem and Lapuente 2010). 
Second, performance outcomes are either observed at the level of organisations or 
at the level of individuals. The former focuses on indicators such as the financial 
performance of firms. By contrast, at the individual level studies examine the job 
satisfaction, commitment, turnover and personal health and wellbeing.  
The fourfold distinction of approaches to the study of human resource 
management and organizational performance provides a helpful foundation for 
assessing the impact of austerity measures on the motivation of public officials, 
                                                                                                         
16 The difficulty to define motivation or more specifically ‘work motivation’, which focuses on work-related 
behaviour, is widely recognised (Rainey 2001, Wright 2001). Yet definitions tend to find common ground 
in their focus on effort exerted by the employee and the reference to intensity, direction and 
persistence/duration of effort. Note also that our understanding of motivation differs from the notion of 
‘public service motivation’. The latter is a specific type of motivation defined as ‘an individual 
predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions’ (Perry/Wise 
1990: 368, see Hondeghem/Perry 2009 for a recent review). However, the insights of this body of 
literature are relevant for the present article and will be referred to below. 
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which is the focus of this article. First, among austerity measures we focus on 
cutback measures in relation to civil service management. Cutbacks in the area of 
civil service management primarily fall into the category of reducing operational 
expenditure (Raudla et al 2015). In this article, we focus on five areas of human 
resources management, including austerity-driven changes in recruitment, 
promotion, dismissal, salary management and training (see Demmke 2016 for a 
similar approach). We develop hypotheses for each of these human resource 
management functions and assess the relation to individual perceptions of 
motivation. Second, the research on work motivation in the public and private 
sector directs attention at other factors that might affect change in the context of 
austerity. For this study, we will later control for basic contextual parameters such 
as the severity of cutback measures in a given country and the position of finance 
and economics ministries within each country.  
Hiring freezes  
Recruitment policy refers here to the process of hiring new staff. This may involve 
the expansion of an organisation following the creation of new positions or simply 
the replacement of staff who have departed and hence the filling of vacancies. In 
the context of austerity, hiring freezes have been the main change in the area of 
recruitment policy (Parrado 2010; UNDP 2010; Demmke 2016). Governments have 
stopped to expand the civil service and they have stopped to replace staff and 
hence to fill vacancies. Hiring freezes may be associated with a cut of positions, 
while vacancies are simply maintained for a definite or indefinite time in others.  
For existing staff, hiring freezes should not directly affect their motivation. After all, 
these officials do already have a job in the civil service and they do no longer have 
to compete for a position. However, hiring freezes have an indirect effect in that 
they affect the workload of officials. If vacancies are not filled, the remaining 
officials will have to cover and hence do a fair bit of extra work. As a result, hiring 
freezes have been argued to have negative effects on the job satisfaction of 
officials (Demmke 2016). We should therefore expect that hiring freezes are 
associated with a decline of motivation among public officials.  
H1: The motivation of public officials is more likely to decrease if post-crisis 
recruitment policy has changed including hiring freezes (Recruitment hypothesis).  
Staff cuts  
Dismissal policy refers here to the process of firing officials from the civil service. 
Generally, it might include transfers and relocations in the civil service, but 
dismissals are clearly the most serious of these options in that they involve a 
termination of the public service relationship. In the context of austerity, dismissal 
policy plays a very important role for government. Mass work force cuts, quotas to 
reduce the number of staff, early retirement plans, the abolition of positions and 
terminations in the wake of administrative re-organisations are key instruments for 
governments to reduce fiscal costs and enhance the efficiency of public 
administration (Lodge and Hood 2012; Raudla et al 2015).  
For public officials, a change in dismissal policy might not have a direct effect on 
their motivation at work. However, it has considerable threat potential and might 
undermine staff morale, as officials might fear to lose their job in the future. 
Moreover, it may be associated with higher workload comparable to the impact of 
hiring freezes because the same amount of work will have to be done by fewer 
people. We should therefore expect a negative effect of staff cuts on the motivation 
of public officials.  
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H2: The motivation of public officials is more likely to decrease if post-crisis 
dismissal policy has changed including an increase in workforce cuts (Dismissal 
hypothesis). 
Promotion freezes  
Promotion policy refers to the upward mobility and career advancement of officials 
within an organisation. It might involve automatic promotions, competitions and 
simply nominations to higher ranks and positions. Promotions are usually 
associated with higher salary levels and hence tend to have direct effect on the 
reward levels of officials. In the context of austerity, promotion policy might simply 
lead to a freeze for upward mobility comparable to hiring freezes. Vacant positions 
at the higher level might also be kept open or they might even be cut, as a result of 
which promotion prospects narrow for officials in lower ranks.  
For public officials a change in promotion policy should have a direct effect on their 
motivation, as it reduces opportunities for career advancement and salary 
increases. In rationalist terms, there are fewer incentives to work hard because 
there will be no reward. In addition, it might affect the motivation of officials 
because opportunities for the recognition of good performance and contributions to 
the organisation are no longer available. We should therefore expect that post-
crisis promotion freezes should have a negative effect on the motivation of officials.  
H3: The motivation of public officials is more likely to decrease if post-crisis 
promotion policy has changed including a narrowing of promotion opportunities 
(Promotion hypothesis). 
Salary cuts  
Salary policy is primarily concerned with the monetary compensation of officials. In 
remuneration terms this includes typically a fixed salary plus discretionary and non-
discretionary salary elements. The former include performance bonuses of various 
kinds, while the latter refers to rank-specific supplements, age-related supplements 
etc. In addition, one might consider non-monetary rewards and rewards that are 
paid after the end of the public service relations, in particular, pensions in this 
category (Brans and Peters 2012).  
In the context of cutbacks, most elements of salary management tend to be 
affected (Demmke 2016). Fixed salaries might be frozen or even reduced. 
Similarly, bonuses might be frozen or cut. Non-monetary rewards also tend to be 
on the chopping board during periods of crisis. Public sector pensions are among 
the key areas in which governments aim to make savings, not less because the 
cuts in reward levels are not immediately felt by public officials.  
For public officials, a change in salary policy should have a direct effect on their 
motivation (Guthrie 2008). Salary cuts, in particular, undermine the material 
incentives for public officials to work hard. Bonus cuts, pension cuts etc should 
have the same kind of effect. To be sure, public officials might be happy to have a 
job at all when considering that unemployment might go up in the private sector. 
Yet compared to the pre-crisis period, public officials are still experiencing a lower 
level of compensation for the same or even a higher level of workload. We 
therefore expect that austerity-driven changes in salary policy are associated with 
a decrease in motivation among public officials.  
H4: The motivation of public officials is more likely to decrease if post-crisis salary 
policy has changed including salary cuts (Salary hypothesis).  
Cutting training opportunities  
Training policy refers here to the development of skills and competencies of public 
officials in the context of their employment relation. It differs from pre-service 
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training such as university education. In-service training can take a large number of 
forms such as short and long courses funded and provided by ministries and 
agencies, national schools and institute for the training of officials, universities, 
international organisations and the private sector. It might also include support for 
university study at home and abroad, exchanges and increasingly online 
education.  
Cutback measures in the area of training policy most naturally involve the reduction 
in the provision of training opportunities (Metsma 2014). This may range from a 
reduction of budgetary resources to the closure of public training institutes. 
Moreover, training budgets tend to be soft budgets in the sense that governments 
find it less difficult to cut funding in this area during a period of crisis (Demmke 
2016).  
For public officials, we should expect that a cut in the provision of training 
opportunities lowers the motivation of officials. Training provides an opportunity to 
develop skills and hence to perform well on the job. Participation in training 
courses also tends to provide an incentive for staff, in particular, when it involves 
travel abroad or the acquisition of higher-level qualifications such as via study 
abroad programmes. We therefore expect cutbacks in the area of training policy 
after the crisis to have a negative effect on the motivation of officials.  
H5: The motivation of public officials is more likely to decrease if post-crisis training 
policy has changed including a reduction in training opportunities (Training 
hypothesis).  
Post-crisis civil service reforms in Latvia and Poland  
The analysis is based on a survey of ministerial officials that was conducted in 
2010/2011 in Latvia and Poland. Latvia and Poland are two new member states 
from post-communist Central and Eastern Europe that joined the EU in 2004. With 
regard to the impact of the global economic crisis, the two countries differ 
significantly (Bideleux 2011). Latvia belongs to the EU members that was hardest 
hit by the crisis, while Poland belongs to the member states that was least affected. 
In Latvia, in 2009 economic output declined by 17.7 per cent, the highest slump in 
economic growth in the EU. The government deficit rose to 9.8 of GDP in and 
unemployment went from 6.5 per cent in 2007 to 18.2 per cent in 2009 and 19.8 
per cent in 2010.17  
In the winter of 2008/2009, Latvia asked the IMF and the EU for financial support in 
order to avoid default following the nationalisation of the Latvian bank Parex. The 
international loans were linked to a clear commitment from the Latvian government 
to reform its public finance by means of fiscal measures, social welfare reform, 
economic restructuring and specific measures for the reform of the financial sector. 
The programme for Economic Stabilisation and Growth included specific measures 
to reform public administration by means of reorganisation and expenditure cuts 
(Government of Latvia 2008).  
In the context of the so-called Optimisation Plan for the reform of public 
administration, the government passed a range of civil service reform measures 
most of which aimed to cut operational expenditures. They included: 
 Staff cuts by over 10 per cent (25.000 out of 205.000 officials were to be 
cut) primarily in the context of the re-organisation of public administration 
(Leta 2009).  
                                                                                                         
17 For growth and unemployment figures, please see the official Eurostat figures available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home. 
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 The government did not take an explicit decision on recruitment. However, 
due to need to downsize staff, it became impossible for ministries and 
agencies to hire new staff. 
 Promotion freezes and formal downgrades in the context of the structural 
reorganisation of ministries and agencies in many ministries, while other 
ministries chose to dismiss officials. For heads of units, for instance, this 
meant that over a short period of time they became so-called senior 
officers and, as a result, lost their managerial attributes. Promotions were 
not formally frozen but in practice they took no longer place.  
 Salary cuts by 15 per cent in January 2009 and again by around 20 per 
cent for top and middle staff in June 2009. Managers were given discretion 
to decide whether they would prefer to cut salaries at the top or mid-level. 
This led to considerable differences in the way salary cuts were 
experienced by civil servants (Memorandum 2009; Darzina 2009). 
 The central government cut the funding for training institutions and training 
activities. The Latvian School of Public Administration lost 99 per cent of its 
funding (LSPA 2011). Training had to be paid for by ministries, agencies or 
personally by civil servants, leading to a major decline in training activities.  
In contrast to Latvia, Poland experienced a softer landing after the global financial 
crisis hit Europe (Bideleux 2011). Economic growth remained positive for the entire 
post-crisis period reaching a low point of 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2009 but 
accumulating 17 per cent during the period from 2008 to 2012; the highest growth 
rate among EU member states. In 2008 and 2009, the unemployment rate varied 
between 7 and 9 per cent and until the end of 2012 it never rose above 10.5 per 
cent. Despite these positive figures, Poland experienced a high government deficit 
of 7.4 per cent of GDP in 2009 and public debt has continuously risen since the 
beginning of the global economic crisis towards its constitutional limit (see Rae 
2013).  
Given the far more moderate impact of the global economic crisis, the government 
of Poland did not embark on any major public administration reform. The Civil 
Service Law was amended in November 2008 but the change was not related to 
the looming crisis in the region. Yet several measures were still taken to address 
the changing context of public administration.  
 The area of recruitment was affected in two ways. On the one hand, Bida 
(2009) argues that the number of vacancies that was publicly advertised 
increased. Moreover, he argues that both the number and quality of 
applicants per post increased compared to the pre-crisis period. On the 
other hand, the government reduced the quota of civil servants who were 
given the status of ‘nominated civil servant’, Poland differs from other 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe in that it distinguishes ‘nominated 
civil servants’ and ‘civil service employees’, The former have to undergo a 
lengthy recruitment and selection procedure, a preparatory service, they 
enjoy full tenure and significantly higher salary levels. Currently, just under 
5 per cent of all civil servants (6.000 out of 122.000) are ‘nominated civil 
servants’, Initially the government aimed to raise this proportion to 10 per 
cent of all civil servants. However, in the context of austerity the 
government admitted a declining proportion of candidates who had 
successfully passed the nomination exam and even reduced the quota for 
new nominations to merely 200 in 2013 and 2014 (Gazeta Prawna 2011).  
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 The government did not establish specific targets to reduce the staff 
numbers in central government ministries and agencies. Measures were 
taken to facilitate dismissals by means of disciplinary proceedings that 
were brought in line with the Labour Code but no efforts were made to 
downsize the civil service.  
 The government did not pass specific measures to reduce promotion 
prospects for civil servants. However, following lengthy discussion the 
government decided that nominated civil servants would not be granted an 
automatic promotion if they pass two performance reviews successfully. 
This measure can be considered as a way of narrowing the promotion 
prospects for higher and senior civil servants (Gazeta Prawna 2013a).  
 In the area of salary management, the government reviewed the salary 
bands shortly after the economic crisis emerged (Zieliński 2009). Even if 
this measure required additional government funds for some ministries, it 
was also decided that civil service salaries would be frozen from 2008. 
Since then they have increased but below the level of inflation, implying 
real wage decline for civil servants (Gazeta Prawna 2013b). 
 With regard to training policy the government reviewed the process of 
selecting training providers. At the same time, training provision for civil 
servants was maintained at similar levels compared to the pre-crisis 
period.  
The comparison of austerity-driven civil service reform strategies in the two 
countries suggests that human resource management practices were likely to 
change to a much larger extent in Latvia than in Poland. Yet in both cases, reforms 
are associated with a ‘negative’ development in that staff levels were cut, fewer 
officials were hired, promotion prospects narrowed, salaries were frozen or even 
cut and the provision of training was reduced. We would expect these 
developments to be reflected in the survey results and we would certainly expect 
that the motivation of officials in Latvia decreased to a larger extent than in Poland.   
Data, operationalization and descriptive results 
The empirical analysis is based on a survey of public officials that was conducted 
in the winter of 2010/2011 in Latvia and in the spring of 2011 in Poland (see also 
Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen 2016). It targeted civil servants employed at central 
government ministries. The survey was conducted in local languages as an online 
survey. It generated 1520 responses, including 972 from Poland and 547 from 
Latvia. The reliance on a web-based survey implies that we had no perfect control 
over the population of respondents, that is, we do not know with certainty who 
precisely was invited to participate in the online survey and whether officials who 
were invited also had a chance to complete the survey.  
In order to maximise the consistency of the data across the two countries, we 
applied the same sampling procedure. In a first step, personal meetings were 
arranged with senior officials from the Civil Service Department in Poland and the 
State Chancellery in Latvia in order to explain the nature and purpose of the 
survey. Next, we sent the survey link together with a detailed explanation to our 
partners at the central institutions who then distributed the link to the heads of 
personnel in the ministries. In Latvia, this role is performed by the State Secretary. 
In Poland, the Director General is responsible for personnel affairs. Heads of 
personnel then sent the survey link to all civil servants employed in the core 
structure of their ministry. 
As to the representativeness of the sample, we were able to check it in Poland 
against the population of officials in civil service ranks. It suggests that our sample 
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is reasonably representative. Men are slightly over-represented in the sample (42 
per cent as opposed to 35 per cent in the Polish civil service) and – as one might 
expect when conducting a web-based survey – young civil servants are over-
represented (29 per cent as opposed to 23 per cent in the Polish civil service). We 
assume a similar level of representativeness for the Latvian sample but have not 
been able to secure population-based data that would have allowed for a valid 
comparison against our sample data. For the analysis below we address potential 
biases by controlling for demographic variables such as sex, age and experience in 
public administration. 
The survey primarily asked questions with regard to the implementation of civil 
service policy and the attitudes of officials towards principles of civil service 
management. A subset of questions directly addressed the experience of 
respondents with post-crisis civil service management. Answers were measured on 
the Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Respondents were given the option ‘don’t know’ if they could not or did not want to 
answer a question. For the analysis ‘don’t know’ responses were re-coded as 
‘neutral’ responses.18  
Ideally, we would be able to measure the motivation of officials by means of panel 
data that compares the pre- and post-crisis situation in the civil service in the two 
countries. Unfortunately, we do not have directly comparable data for such two 
points in time. In order to address this limitation, the survey included several 
questions that directly addressed the experience with civil service management 
since the onset of the global economic crisis. For instance, we asked ‘The practice 
of promoting staff in my ministry has not changed since the beginning of the global 
financial crisis and its repercussions for my country’, It should be noted that we 
asked for ‘non-change’ therefore assuming that civil service management practices 
might have persisted since the pre-crisis period. For the analysis we reversed the 
coding of the variable for ease of interpretation. Throughout the analysis in this 
article, a higher value therefore indicates more change in the respective area of 
human resource management.  
Second, asking for change does of course not tell us ‘what kind of change’ nor 
‘what direction of change’, We addressed this issue by asking a follow-up question 
in which respondents could specify what, according to them, had changed, for 
instance, in the practice of promoting staff. A large proportion of respondents 
completed the open questions and has provided rich insight into the perception of 
officials vis-à-vis post-crisis civil service reforms. Most answers were short but they 
would usually be unambiguous specifying ‘salary cuts’, ‘bonus cuts’, ‘no 
recruitment of new staff’, ‘no more promotions’, ‘no more trainings’, or in many 
cases simply ‘no change’,  
The open answers have allowed us to interpret the Likert scale questions and to 
assume relatively confidently that ‘change’ is by and large synonymous with 
‘negative change’, ‘decline’ or ‘cuts’, For each of the five areas of civil service 
management, we have been able to identify patterns that allow us to associate 
change with ‘hiring freezes’ in the case of recruitment policy, ‘a growing number of 
dismissals’ for dismissal policy, ‘promotion freezes’ for promotion policy, ‘salary 
cuts’ for salary management and a ‘reduction of training opportunities’ for training 
policy. These patterns apply to both countries. They simply differ in the extent to 
which respondents report change of this kind (see below, Table 1).  
The survey also included one question that asked for the change in motivation of 
officials. The motivation question explicitly asked  ‘Officials in my ministry are as 
                                                                                                         
18 The analysis below was also conducted without including ‘don’t know’ responses. Substantively, the 
results are the same. It should be noted that the survey contains selective non-response, leaving up to 
15 per cent of some of the variables missing.  
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motivated to do their job as they were before the global financial crisis and its 
repercussions for my country.’ Asking with regard to the departmental level rather 
than the individual level has the advantage that answers might be subject to less 
social desirability bias, as respondents might not have wanted to indicate openly 
that their own motivation level has declined since the onset of the crisis.19  
For the question on the motivation of officials we did not ask an open follow-up 
question in the survey. We can therefore not rely on a second, open-ended survey 
response to ascertain that a change in motivation among ministerial officials is 
equivalent to a decrease in motivation. However, before and after conducting the 
survey we were able to conduct personal conversations with managing and non-
managing civil servants in the two countries.20 They indicated that a negative 
connotation is plausible in that officials were – to varying degrees – disappointed, 
frustrated and over-worked after the austerity measures hit the civil service.21 We 
therefore assume for the empirical analysis that change in motivation is equal to a 
decline in motivation after the crisis.  
Table 1 lists the means and standard deviations for the dependent variable and the 
main independent variables. As mentioned earlier, a higher score indicates a 
higher degree of change, while a score of 1 indicates no change at all. For 
motivational change, the two-country mean is close to a neutral response of 3. The 
higher mean for Latvia suggests that the austerity measures had a much greater 
impact on the motivation of public officials in Latvia than in Poland.  
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics  
Poland Latvia Total 
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Motivation 
change 2.79 0.91 3.28 0.98 2.96 0.97 
Recruitment 
change 2.79 0.86 2.69 0.85 2.75 0.86 
Promotions 
change 2.71 0.77 2.74 0.83 2.72 0.80 
Dismissals 
change 2.71 0.75 2.92 0.78 2.79 0.76 
Salaries 
change 2.65 1.05 3.31 0.99 2.88 1.08 
Training 
change 2.76 0.82 3.54 0.97 3.04 0.96 
Table 1 also shows important differences with regard to the independent variables, 
in particular, the experience with post-crisis civil service management. The values 
for recruitment and promotion policy, for instance, do not differ much, and in both 
countries, they indicate similar developments. By contrast, in the areas of 
dismissals and, in particular, salary and training policy the differences between 
Latvia and Poland are larger. In these cases, the open answers echo the austerity 
measures outlined above. A large proportion of Latvian respondents simply 
answered, ‘salary cut by 30 per cent’, ‘salary cut by 40 per cent’, ‘no more 
                                                                                                         
19 While the survey question provides a general indicator of the degree of motivation among ministerial 
staff and a first attempt to address the problem of post-crisis change in motivation, we are acutely aware 
that motivation is ideally measured by more than one item (Beulens/Van den Broeck 2007, Wright 
2001). 
20 We did not conduct systematic interviews. However, the regular conversations with staff in the context 
of the preparation and implementation of the survey have given us valuable insights for the 
interpretation of the data.  
21 It should be recognised of course that for many there was also a sense of relief in that they could hold 
on to their job while unemployment rates rose.   
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bonuses’, ‘no more training’ etc. By contrast, for Polish respondent, a much larger 
proportion suggested ‘no change’ or merely ‘no salary increase’, ‘salaries have 
been frozen’ etc. In other words, the cutback measures are clearly reflected 
respondents’ statements.  
One of the major merits of our survey is that it captures how public officials appear 
to experience cutbacks in different ways. Indeed, it is likely that cutbacks in the 
area of civil service management are not uniformly implemented across public 
administration, as it is more than common that certain institutions and jobs are 
sheltered while others are earmarked for change (see Parrado 2010). Moreover, 
even if a much larger proportion of Latvian officials evidently ‘complained’ about 
salary cuts, the open survey responses indicated that there were considerable 
differences in the depth of the cuts, ranging from 5 – 50 per cent. This clearly 
reflects the government’s post-crisis policy, whereby senior managers were given 
discretion to allocate the salary cuts of the second stage of reforms in the summer 
of 2009.  
For the assessment of our hypotheses, we include several control variables. First, 
we include basic demographic variables such as sex, age, experience in public 
administration and education in order to control for potential biases in our sample 
and to take into account the literature on work motivation in the public and private 
sector (for example, Buelens and Van den Broeck 2007). For sex we include a 
dummy variable for ‘female’, Both age and experience are measured in bands and 
dummy variables are included accordingly. With regard to the level of education it 
is worth mentioning that the survey distinguishes degrees that have been 
completed and degrees that are still in progress. For the analysis, we code finished 
and unfinished degrees in the same category (e.g. ‘finished and unfinished PhD 
degree’, which acts as the reference category below), as we consider participation 
in an MA programme to be closer in educational experience to the completion of an 
MA than to a completed BA programme.  
Further, the rank of respondents is included, as managers with more 
responsibilities and control within an organisation are likely to be more motivated. 
They might also be more optimistic in their assessment of the motivational levels of 
their staff (Rainey 2001; Buelens and Van den Broeck 2007). We therefore include 
a dummy variable for ‘manager’ in our models.  
Finally, we control for the country of origin and the ministry in which the official 
works. As outlined above, we expect that motivational change is greater in Latvia 
than in Poland due to the severity of the crisis and the scale of the subsequent 
austerity measures. Finally, we include a dummy variable for officials who work in 
finance and economics ministries. We expect that they remain more motivated 
after the crisis because they might be less affected by the cutbacks. Many of the 
austerity measures – outlined above – target social policy, while officials in finance 
and economic affairs are more likely to be sheltered from negative effects. 
Moreover, their status may even be elevated in that they might see themselves as 
the ones who solve the economic crisis.  
Results and discussion  
Table 2 presents the results of the analysis for the explanation of motivation among 
public officials. The Table consists of four models. Model 1 shows the impact of 
five human resource management practices on motivation without controlling for 
country and ministry context and without taking into account demographic 
confounders. Model 2 adds the country and the position of finance and economics 
ministries in order to take into account broad features of the work context.  
Model 3 presents the main results of the linear regression analysis. It shows the 
five main variables together with the contextual and the demographic variables. 
Model 4 is primarily meant as a robustness check. It presents the results of a 
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logistic regression analysis showing the odds that a change in motivation occurs. 
The presentation of the logistic regression analysis is limited to the model that 
includes the main variables and the control variables.  
Looking at the results, model 3 shows that changes in recruitment, dismissal and 
training policy decrease motivation among public officials. The three variables are 
significant at the 1 per cent level and confirm the hypotheses that hiring freezes, 
staff cuts and a reduction of training opportunities reduce the motivation of 
ministerial staff. In relative terms, changes in the provision of training have the 
largest effect (b = 0.16, t = 4.48, p < 0.001). The magnitude of the effect of hiring 
freezes (b = 0.11, t = 2.90, p < 0.004) and staff cuts (b = 0.11, t = 2.41, p < 0.016) 
is slightly smaller.    
Table 2. Change of motivation since the beginning of the global economic crisis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 B B B Exp(B) 
(Constant) 1.604*** 1.626*** 0.506 0.434 
Recruitment policy change 0.094*** 0.107*** 0.112*** 1.254** 
Promotion policy change 0.001 -0.012 -0.014 1.075 
Dismissal policy change 0.069** 0.11** 0.105*** 1.396*** 
Salary policy change 0.094*** 0.047 0.045 1.117 
Training policy change  0.206*** 0.158*** 0.155*** 1.251*** 
Latvia  0.352*** 0.301*** 1.49** 
Finance ministries  0.061 0.042 0.958 
Manager   0.022 0.993 
Female    -0.035 1.129 
Age (ref. cat. ‘under 30 years’)     
30 to 40 years   -0.142* 0.841 
40 to 50 years   -0.094 0.922 
50 years and older   -0.345*** -0.643* 
Experience in public admin (ref.cat. ‘< 1 
year’)     
1 to 4 years   -0.069 0.207*** 
5 to 10 years   0.071 0.262*** 
11 and more years   0.048 0.225*** 
Education (ref.cat. ‘PhD degree’)     
MA degree   0.125 1.349 
BA degree   0.123 1.405 
No higher education   0.184 1.781 
R Square 0.099 0.125 0.133  
Nagelkerke R Square 0.139 
Note: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
By far the largest significant coefficient belongs to the country dummy variable and 
hence the differences between Latvia and Poland (b = 0.30, t = 4.06, p < 0.001). It 
suggests that even if the five human resource management variables are likely to 
absorb a great deal of the differences in officials’ experience with cutback 
measures, a range of wider country-level factors must be taken into account when 
seeking to understand differential change in motivation among officials. By 
contrast, employment in finance and economics ministries does not have an effect 
on motivation. Country differences and differences in the way cutbacks are 
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experienced appears to be more relevant for motivational change than the 
ministerial work context within countries.  
Model 4, which presents the results of the logistic regression analysis, confirms the 
significant effect of changes in recruitment, dismissals and training policy on 
motivation. The odds of observing a change in motivation are 39.6 per cent higher 
for officials who have experienced major staff cuts in their department. For officials 
who have experienced hiring freezes and a cut in training provision the odds of 
perceiving a change in motivation are slightly lower at 25 per cent.  
Model 4 also confirms the major effect of the country context and hence the scale 
of the cutback measures. For Latvian officials the odds of having experienced 
motivational change in their ministry are 49 per cent higher than for Polish officials. 
Model 4 indicates that officials from finance and economics ministry do not differ in 
their perception of motivation after the implementation of the cutbacks.  
Table 2 further suggests that salary cuts and promotion freezes are not associated 
with a change in motivation. The effect of changes in salary policy shrinks and 
loses significance when the country and ministerial contexts are included in the 
analysis (compare models 1 and 2). Promotion freezes, by contrast, do not have 
any significant effect on motivational change among public officials. The structure 
of the civil service systems in Poland and Latvia is likely to be responsible for the 
irrelevance of promotion freezes. Both countries operate a position-based system 
that does not provide much room for promotions (Meyer-Sahling 2009; Demmke 
and Moilanen 2010). Career advancement tends to require participation in several 
rounds of competition procedures rather than any prospect of automatic promotion. 
The relative importance of changes in recruitment policy, which refers to all levels 
in the hierarchy rather than just the entry level, captures this aspect of the civil 
service systems in the two countries very well.   
The secondary role of salary policy might be more surprising, as conventional 
wisdom would initially point to the detrimental effect of salary cuts for the 
motivation of employees. However, research that compares the motivational basis 
of private and public sector employees tends to argue that public sector employees 
are less motivated by monetary rewards (Boyne 2002; Beulens and Van den 
Broeck 2007). They tend to value job security, a supportive work environment and 
a better work-life balance more than their private sector peers (Chen and Hsieh 
2015). To be sure, the lower importance of mechanisms of extrinsic motivation 
such as salaries and promotions also resonates closely with the research on 
‘public service motivation’ which stress that public officials are motivated by 
working for a ‘good cause’ and not just for monetary reward (for a recent review, 
see Perry et al 2010).  
The importance of training, dismissal and recruitment policy relative to salary and 
promotion policy resonates closely with this line of argumentation. Training budgets 
tend to be one of the first items that are cut when savings have to be made 
(Demmke 2016). Yet the analysis supports the view that public officials value the 
opportunity to develop their skills and competences to better perform their job. Both 
recruitment freezes and staff cuts also relate closely to the quality of the work 
environment and hence the working conditions. They inevitably increase the 
workload of officials and, in addition, one should not underestimate the negative 
impact on staff morale in the departments following staff cuts and re-organisations.  
Model 3 and 4 also show the role of demographic factors on motivation among 
officials in Latvia and Poland. Model 3 and 4 suggest that older officials are less 
likely to perceive motivational change within their institution. Moreover, according 
to model 4 officials with more years of experience are less likely to perceive a 
change of motivation. The results suggest that the older generation has responded 
less negatively to cutbacks in the civil service. Older as well as more experienced 
officials have fewer job opportunities outside the administration and they are more 
likely to seek (to continue) a long-term career in the civil service given their 
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experience so far. They might therefore be more willing to bear the consequences 
of the cutbacks and they appear to be more likely to accept the need to get on with 
the job even under adverse conditions.  
Conclusion  
This article has examined the impact of cutbacks in the area of civil service 
management on the motivation of public officials in Latvia and Poland. Based on a 
survey of ministerial officials, it has shown that Latvian officials are more likely to 
perceive changes in motivation than their peers from Poland. The differences 
clearly reflect the scale of the austerity-driven cutbacks in Latvia in comparison to 
Poland.  
With regard to different areas of civil service management, the article has shown 
that changes in recruitment, dismissals and training policy undermine the 
motivation of staff in central government ministries. In the context of cutback 
management, these changes tend to refer to hiring freezes, staff cuts and a 
reduction in the provision of training. By contrast, salary cuts and promotion 
freezes did not negatively affect the motivation of public officials.  
The results suggest that public officials in Latvia and Poland are relatively less 
motivated by monetary rewards and prospects of career advancement. This finding 
resonates with research on employee motivation in the private and public sector. 
Extrinsic motivation, which focuses on material incentives, tends to be less relevant 
for public sector employees (Boyne 2002; Buelens and Van den Broeck 2007, 
Chen and Hsieh 2015). By contrast, recruitment freezes, staff cuts and cuts in 
training provision are more closely related to workload considerations, the quality 
of the working conditions and interest in self-development. These factors tend to be 
valued highly by public sector employees. The findings of this article suggest that 
these differences also apply in the context of austerity programmes.  
The article relied on the analysis of post-crisis survey data rather than a 
comparison of data from before and after the crisis hit the two Central and Eastern 
European countries. Inevitably there is some uncertainty regarding the findings. 
Moreover, for the purpose the analysis we had to rely on comparably simple 
measures of motivation and motivational change. However, the differences 
between the two countries and the perception of austerity-driven civil service 
reforms as reported in quantitative and qualitative answers are reasonably 
plausible and provide a first glimpse at the trade-offs that governments face when 
seeking to implement austerity-oriented reforms.  
Cutbacks in the area of civil service management have been and are likely to 
remain key instruments for governments to reduce costs and increase efficiency in 
public administration during times of crisis. This article has shown that the 
implementation of these kinds of measures entails additional, hidden costs for 
government, in that they appear to undermine the motivation of public officials. 
However, the costs of reform depend on the scale of the cutbacks and they are not 
uniform across areas of civil service management, giving governments some 
discretion over the choice of instruments. It remains to be seen to what extent the 
results for Latvia and Poland hold up to the inclusion of more countries and a 
longer-term comparison over time.  
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